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COMMENTS
PERCENTAGE LEASES: IS THERE A NEED TO
IMPLY A COVENANT OF CONTINUOUS
OPERATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
A percentage lease is one which contains a rental, paid by a commercial
lessee, based upon a percentage of gross sales or receipts.1 This type of lease
antedates this century,' but did not become common until the Depression
years. During this time, the unstable economy necessitated renegotiation of
leases with a fixed rent.' Today, prevailing social and economic factors
have perpetuated the use of percentage leases.4
1. Kline, Percentage Leases: May Lessee Vacate Premises?, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 612, 612
(1970) (citing Friendly Center, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 F. Supp. 274 (D.N.C. 1954)); Hemingway,
Selected Problems in Leases of Community and Regional Shopping Centers, 16 BAYLOR L. REV 1
(1964)). For example, a tenant who pays rent at $1000 per month and one-half percent on all gross
sales over $1,000,000 is engaged in a percentage lease. The amount of percentage rent is com-
monly based on gross receipts, but can also be based on net receipts, gross profits, net profits, or
any other variable that measures the tenant's business productivity. R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN
LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5.3, at 231 n.17 (1980). A percentage lease has also been
defined as a lease "wherein the tenant is required to pay as rental a specified percentage of the
gross income from the total sales made upon the premises." S. MCMICHAEL, LEASES - PER-
CENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG TERM 21 (4th ed. 1947).
2. Smiley v. McLauthlin, 138 Mass. 363 (1885)); 1 M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES
§ 6.1, at 158 (2d ed. 1983) (citing House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 630 (1858)).
3. 1 M. FRIEDMAN, supra, note 2, § 6.1.
Strangely enough, the percentage lease or percentage rental was first given widespread use
in Depression days as a device for the protection of tenants. At that time, many merchants
were weighed down by high rents and declining business. They sought some compromise
in their lease agreements which might be based on business volume. Many owners agreed
readily to this form [the percentage lease] of recasting the lease agreement because they
viewed it as a necessary device to keep a good tenant in business.
S. MCMICHAEL, LEASES - PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG TERM 34 (5th ed. 1959). More-
over, most tenants were unable or unwilling to pay high fixed minimum rental during the Depres-
sion years. Accordingly, the percentage lease was of great benefit to the tenant. N. HECHT, LONG
TERM LEASE PLANNING AND DRAFTING 77 (1974).
4. Thigpen, Good Faith Performance Under Percentage Leases, 51 Miss. L.J. 315, 315 (1980-
81). Many of the prevailing social and economic factors result in advantages to both the landlord
and the tenant. For a discussion of the percentage leases' advantages over the fixed rental lease,
see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.66, at 320-25 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Denz, Percentage,
Cost of Living and Revaluation Leases, 44 ILL. B.J. 312 (1956); Comment, The Lessee's Obligation
Under a Percentage Lease, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 677 (1965); Note, The Percentage Lease - Its
Functions and Drafting Problems, 61 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1947) [hereinafter Note, Drafting
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The percentage lease creates a unique business relationship between the
landlord and tenant. This business relationship is commonly known as a
"quasi-partnership." ' As a result of this "quasi-partnership," the parties
share in the success and failure of the business.6 For example, the landlord
invests in the future of a tenant's business by foregoing a fixed minimum
rental based on the fair market value of the property.7 While initial rent
receipts may be low, the landlord receives a greater rental rate based on a
percentage of the lessee's profits as the business becomes increasingly suc-
cessful. In time, the rent received may surpass the fair market value of the
property. Likewise, the tenant shares in the success and failure of the busi-
ness by avoiding an initially high rental rate and then reinvesting any
earned profits into the business with a goal of greater productivity in the
future.' Consequently, the percentage lease provides the tenant with a rea-
sonable opportunity to establish a successful business. Once the business is
Problems]; Note, Resolving Disputes Under Percentage Leases, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1139 (1967)
[hereinafter Note, Resolving Disputes].
With respect to the landlord, the percentage lease enables the landlord to achieve a fair rental
on the value or productivity of property. See, e.g., Landis, Problems in Drafting Percentage
Leases, 36 B.U.L. REV. 190 (1956). When a leased property becomes more valuable as a result of
the tenant's efforts, the rent adjusts automatically. See Comment, supra. By attracting aggressive
tenants who are willing to share the initial business risks, a landlord may receive more rental,
through the percentage rent provision, as the business operation becomes increasingly successful.
See Landis, supra. The obvious benefit to the tenant is that the rental expense can be "fixed" as an
acceptable percentage of gross sales. This provides the tenant with the necessary flexibility and
"cushion" in the early years of the tenant's business at the leased premises. Comment, supra, at
677. A percentage lease provides the tenant with more time to fully establish the business enter-
prise before the rental expense would approximate market value. Thereafter, as the business be-
comes more successful, the tenant has an ability to pay greater rental to the landlord.
5. Thigpen, supra note 4, at 326. Although the percentage lease does in fact create a quasi
partnership, some states have statutes which negate an inference of a partnership by reason of a
landlord's receipt of rent based on the tenant's productivity in the property. See, e.g., UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(4)(b), 6 U.L.A. 39 (1969); Wis. STAT. § 178.04(3) (1987-88).
6. At a minimum, the percentage lease provides the tenant occupancy of the premises at a
rent affordable during times of economic decline and provides the landlord with an opportunity to
share in the tenant's success of the business without the negative aspect of a long-term rental. See
Note, Drafting Problems, supra note 4. As an early example of this sharing agreement, English
feudal lords required serfs to share an agreed upon percentage of cultivated crops. See Denz,
Lease Provisions Designed to Meet Changing Economic Conditions, 1952 U. ILL. L.F. 344, 351.
7. Although the landlord foregoes a larger fixed minimum rental, the percentage lease allevi-
ates problems of inflation. "Whenever inflationary conditions cause the current dollar receipts to
fluctuate, the share of inflationary dollars payable to the lessor will vary proportionately." N.
HECHT, supra note 3, at 77.
8. This is particularly important to both the landlord and tenant when a tenant with little or
no experience is engaging in a new business venture, or the tenant is setting up shop in an area of
economic decline with need of economic rehabilitation. Note, Drafting Problems, supra note 4, at
320.
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successful, the tenant "shares" the success with the landlord by paying an
increased rental. Thus, as one commentator has precisely stated:
Shared participation in the fruits of the demised premises is a central
theme of percentage rental agreements. The landlord, by virtue of
his agreement to accept a reduced return on his investment in times
of business decline, is promised a percentage of profits or gross re-
turns throughout the term of the lease. Thus, in a substantial sense,
the lessor and lessee can be viewed as being in business together.
They are partners, or at least quasi-partners, in a voluntary business
association based on contract. 9
However, this voluntary association based on a percentage lease is not
without drawbacks. If the tenant does not put forth a "good faith" effort in
operating the business,10 or prematurely vacates the premises,11 the land-
lord receives little or no rental. To avoid this problem, the percentage lease
must be carefully drafted, setting forth the parties' intentions with respect
to operation of the business during the lease term. After all, it is the con-
duct of the tenant's business that determines the "value" of the leased
premises to the landlord. Unfortunately, all too often the lease agreement is
not carefully drafted and it fails to define the parties' rights and obligations.
These poorly drafted lease agreements lead to conflicts, which in turn, lead
to litigation. Indeed, one conflict which has been the subject of much litiga-
tion arises when a tenant prematurely vacates the premises.12
When the tenant prematurely vacates the premises, the landlord seeks
judicial relief in order to protect his or her financial interest in the property.
Generally, when the percentage lease does not expressly require a tenant to
maintain operations for the duration of the lease term, judicial relief is
sought in the form of an implied covenant of continuous operation. By
implying a covenant of continuous operation, a court provides an appropri-
ate remedy to the landlord for the breach thereof; to wit, the tenant must
9. Thigpen, supra note 4, at 326.
10. See Thigpen, supra note 4.
11. See, eg., Kline, supra note 1, at 612.
There are several reasons why a percentage lessee might want to abandon the leased prem-
ises before the expiration of the lease. First, he may have a very successful venture and
wants to increase its success by lessening or eliminating the percentage of his sales that
must be paid to the lessor. Thus, he might abandon the premises in favor of a nearby
location with a more economically favorable lease. Second, the lessee might be attempting
to avoid a losing venture. His sales volume might be quite high which, of course, would
entitle the lessor to a large percentage rent. But, the cost of operations might be so high
that maintaining that level of sales would mean sustaining losses.
Id.
12. Note, Resolving Disputes, supra note 4, at 1144-46.
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pay damages1 3 or render specific performance of the lease agreement, 4 or
the landlord is entitled to terminate the lease.1 5
However, careful lease drafting or the availability of court remedies
makes implying a covenant of continuous operation wholly unnecessary.
Inconsistent results in the application of covenants of continuous operation,
in order to provide landlords with a fair rental upon premature vacation of
the premises, leads this commentator to believe that other remedial meth-
ods should be used to provide the landlord with the fair rental of the prop-
erty. This Comment will discuss some of the problems that courts have
faced when implying a covenant of continuous operation in a percentage
lease. Section II explores the general provisions which courts interpret to
determine whether to imply a covenant of continuous operation.16 Section
III provides a presentation of the court's interpretive methods with respect
to a covenant of continuous operation. 7 Section IV addresses the issue of
damages with respect to the implied covenant of continuous operation.18
Finally, Section V will conclude that there is no need to imply a covenant of
continuous operation to provide the landlord with the fair rental value of
the property.' 9
II. DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT OF
CONTINUOUS OPERATION
A covenant is generally defined as a promise or agreement to engage or
not to engage in some type of conduct.2 0 There are two types of covenants
- express and implied .2  An express covenant is a promise or agreement
explicitly stated within the terms of a lease.22 An implied covenant must be
inferred from the terms of an agreement, to give full force and effect to the
mutual intentions of each party. 3 As a general rule, implied covenants are
13. See infra notes 111-22.
14. See infra notes 104-10.
15. This Comment will not discuss in any detail the landlord's remedy of terminating the
lease.
16. See infra notes 20-83 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 101-43 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Bald v. Neurenberger, 267 II. 616, 622, 108 N.E. 724, 726 (1915); Beall v.
Hardie, 717 Kan. 353, 356, 279 P.2d 276, 278 (1955); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v.
Rosamond, 190 Okla. 46, 50, 120 P.2d 349, 353 (1941). See generally 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions § 1, at 575 (1965) [hereinafter Covenants].
21. Covenants, supra note 20, § 11, at 583.
22. Id.; see, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Griffith, 153 Cal. 502, 506, 95 P. 873, 875 (1908); McDonough
v. Martin, 88 Ga. 675, 677, 16 S.E. 59, 59 (1892).
23. Covenants, supra note 20, § 12, at 584.
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not favored in law.24 This is a result of the general presumption that all
promises or agreements are embodied within the terms of a contract.25 It
does not necessarily follow, however, that a covenant will never be implied
in a percentage lease.26
The implication must arise from language used or it must be indis-
pensable to effectuate [the] intention of parties; it must appear from
language used that it was so clearly within contemplation of parties
that they deemed it unnecessary to express it; implied covenants can
only be justified on grounds of legal necessity; promise can be im-
plied only where it can be rightfully assumed that it would have been
made if attention had been called to it; there can be no implied cove-
nant where [the] subject is completely covered by contract.2 7
Starting with the premise that no express covenant of continuous opera-
tion exists, the specific legal issue confronted by a court in a percentage
lease case is whether to imply a covenant of continuous operation to avoid
depriving the landlord of his or her percentage rental.28 In determining
whether to imply a covenant of continuous operation, courts attempt to
give full force to the mutual intentions of each party.29 This requires an
An implied covenant is one which may reasonably be inferred from the whole agreement
and the circumstances attending its execution. A covenant is viewed as implied in nature
when its existence is inferred by legal construction from the use of certain words and
phrases. There is no limitation upon the form or general character of the words which
may lay the basis for the existence of an implied covenant; rather, the primary concern in
this connection is the intention of the parties to the instrument.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also College Block v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1376,
254 Cal. Rptr. 179 (Ct. App. 1988).
24. Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 515, 647 P.2d 643, 646
(Ct. App. 1982) (citing Smith v. Phleger, 73 Ariz. 11, 236 P.2d 749 (1951)); Keystone Square
Shopping Center Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984);
Downtown Ass'n v. Burrows Bros., 34 Ohio App. 3d 296, 297, 518 N.E.2d 564, 566 (1986).
25. See Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 515, 647 P.2d at 646; Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 706 P.2d 523, 530 (Okla. 1985). As was stated in Walgreen:
This persona non grata status is based primarily on the presumption that when parties have
entered into written agreements which embody the obligations of each, they have expressed
all of the conditions by which they intend to be bound and courts should be reluctant to
enlarge, by implication, on those conditions which affect important matters.
Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 515, 647 P.2d at 646 (citing Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45
Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 (1941)).
26. See Jerrico, Inc. v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
27. Kretch v. Stark, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 385, 392, 193 N.E.2d 307, 315 (1962).
28. Kline, supra note 1, at 613; Comment, supra note 4, at 678-79. The issue exists solely
because the percentage lease fails to adequately declare that the tenant is under an affirmative duty
to operate the premises. 1 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 6.9, at 198.
29. Keystone, 459 N.E.2d at 422 (citing Leving v. Ponderosa Sys., 444 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. App.
1983)).
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interpretation of the lease as a whole.3" Given the fact that the parties are
"6quasi-partners,'' one would think that a covenant to continually operate
the premises is always a mutual intention of the parties. However, this is
not the case, even though the fundamental principle behind a percentage
lease is that the business must continually operate to be successful. 32
As this Comment will further illustrate, similar fact patterns often result
in inconsistent conclusions of law. Nonetheless, since there is nothing
unique in interpreting a percentage lease,33 the same rules of construction
and interpretation that apply to contracts also apply to percentage leases.34
In determining the existence of an implied covenant of continuous opera-
tion, courts generally look at three provisions in the percentage lease: the
rent percentage provision,35 the use clause,36 and the sublet or assignment
clause.
A. The Rent Percentage Provision
The rent percentage provision is that clause in a lease which specifies the
rent received by the landlord. The rental received is generally a combina-
tion of a fixed minimum rental rate and an additional rental based on a
percentage of gross sales or receipts.38 However, there are also "pure" per-
centage leases.39 The implied covenant of continuous operation and the
fixed minimum rental are essentially non-exclusive factors.4 Therefore, the
30. Id.; see also College Block, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 1376, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
31. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text for discussion of the "quasi-partnership"
created by a percentage lease.
32. College Block, 200 Cal. App. 3d 524, 527, 246 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 (Ct. App. 1988) (lessee
unsuccessfully argued that clause permitting removal of "any and all buildings" allowed lessee to
cease operations and peg minimum agreed rents).
33. Downtown Ass'n, 34 Ohio App. 3d at 297, 518 N.E.2d at 565. "In construing and inter-
preting the provisions of percentage leases, the courts have applied traditional contract princi-
ples." Id. (citing Myers v. East Ohio Gas, 51 Ohio St. 2d 121, 364 N.E.2d 1369 (1977)).
34. For example, unclear portions of a lease will be construed against a landlord, unless the
tenant drafted the document. See Cinderella Theatre Co. v. United Detroit Theatre Corp., 367
Mich. 424, 116 N.W.2d 825 (1962). Moreover, the language used in a contract is given its plain
and ordinary meaning unless a technical term is used to convey a specific technical concept. Key-
stone, 459 N.E.2d at 422 (citing Thompson v. Arnold, 238 Ind. 177, 147 N.E.2d 903 (1958)). For
an excellent discussion of contract and property law with respect to leases, see Chase & Taylor,
Landlord and Tenant:. A Study in Property and Contract, 30 VILL. L. REV. 571 (1985).
35. See infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
38. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, § 5.3, at 230-31.
39. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
40. They are not exclusive factors because the amount of fixed minimum rental will have a
direct effect on whether to apply a covenant of continuous operation. All things considered, if the
fixed minimum rental is deemed to be insufficient consideration, the courts will imply the cove-
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amount of fixed minimum rental is an important factor in determining
whether to imply a covenant of continuous operation. In order to eliminate
some of the confusion in interpreting this clause, courts essentially divide
cases into two distinct categories.41 The first category involves a "pure"
percentage rental, or nominal fixed minimum rental,42 while the second cat-
egory involves a substantial fixed minimum rental.43
Courts are generally consistent in implying a covenant of continuous
operation when the rent percentage provision is "pure" or the fixed mini-
mum rental is nominal.' Likewise, courts are generally consistent in declin-
ing to imply a covenant of continuous operation when the fixed minimum
rental is substantial.4" Unfortunately, determining whether the fixed mini-
mum rental is either nominal or substantial is a precarious determination.
Many factors must be considered. Such considerations include the dura-
tion of the lease, the amount of fixed minimum rental paid in relation to the
established fair market value of the property, whether the tenant has ever
paid an additional percentage rental and if so, how much and how often,
and the type of business of the tenant. However, it should be noted that
some courts hold that the amount of fixed minimum rental is immaterial in
determining whether to imply a covenant of continuous operation.46
1. "Pure" Percentage Leases and the Nominal Fixed Minimum Rental
A "pure" percentage lease is one in which no fixed minimum rental is
set; the landlord's return on the value of the leased premises depends en-
tirely upon the efforts and productivity of the tenant.47 If the tenant pro-
duces no income, the landlord receives no rent. A nominal fixed minimum
rental percentage lease is one which provides for an inadequate minimum
nant. If, however, the fixed minimum rental is deemed to be substantial or adequate considera-
tion, then courts will not imply the covenant.
41. Kline, supra note 1, at 612.
42. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., First American Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, 151 Ariz. 584, 729 P.2d
938 (Ct. App. 1986); Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955);
Continental Oil Co. v. Bradley, 198 Colo. 331, 602 P.2d 1 (1979).
45. See, eg., Fifth Ave. Shopping Center v. Grand Union Co., 491 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ga.
1980); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Lackey, 397 So. 2d 1100 (Miss. 1981).
46. See, e.g., Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 512, 647 P.2d at 643; Downtown Ass'n, 34 Ohio App. 3d
at 296, 518 N.E.2d at 564.
47. See, eg., Continental, 198 Colo. at 332, 602 P.2d at 2; Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Davis, 47 Ga.
App. 601, 171 S.E. 150 (1933); Dwyer v. Graham, 110 Ill. App. 3d 316, 442 N.E.2d 298 (App. Ct.
1982), rev'd, 99 Ill. 2d 205, 457 N.E.2d 1239 (1983); Seggebruch v. Stosor, 309 Ill. App. 385, 33
N.E.2d 159 (1941).
1989]
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rental that is payable, regardless of the tenant's success in the business, and
an additional rental based on a percentage of gross sales or receipts.4 8
As previously stated, courts are generally consistent in implying a cove-
nant of continuous operation with these types of leases.4 9 The general ra-
tionale is that when a percentage lease is "pure," or contains only a nominal
fixed minimum rental, the rent percentage provision of the lease is intended
to provide the major portion of the rent." It is therefore unacceptable to
allow a tenant to vacate the premises and stop paying rent, or pay only the
nominal fixed rental. 1
2. Substantial Fixed Minimum Rental Percentage Leases
A substantial fixed minimum rental percentage lease is one which pro-
vides for a substantial or adequate minimum rental, that is payable regard-
less of the tenant's success in the business, and an additional "bonus" or
"windfall" based on a percentage of gross sales or receipts.12 Previously,
most courts held that a percentage lease which contained, in the absence of
an express provision in the lease, a substantial fixed minimum rental did not
obligate the tenant to continually operate the business on the premises.5 3
However, to make the issue more complex, courts presently look more
closely at the circumstances surrounding the execution of a lease in order to
determine whether the parties considered the minimum rental as an ade-
quate return to the landlord. 4
B. The Use Clause in Percentage Leases
Landlords often argue that use clauses prevent the tenant from aban-
doning the premises before the expiration of the lease.55 While this argu-
48. Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 136, 280 P.2d at 775; Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. Girsh, 36 Cal.
2d 677, 227 P.2d 1 (1951).
49. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
50. Kline, supra note 1, at 612.
51. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Leases, Drafting Shopping Center Leases, 2 REAL PROP.,
PROB., AND TRUST J. 222 (1967)).
52. Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1951); William
Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J. Super. 477, 98 A.2d 124 (1953); Dickey v. Philadel-
phia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954).
53. Note, Resolving Disputes, supra note 4, at 1144-45.
54. Id. at 1145; see, e.g., College Block, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 524, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 340; Dwyer,
110 Il. App. 3d at 316, 442 N.E.2d at 298, rev'd, 99 Ill. 2d 205, 457 N.E.2d 1239 (1983); Joffe v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 31 Ohio App. 3d 243, 510 N.E.2d 834 (1986); Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985).
55. 1 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 6.904, at 207. Generally, use clauses are phrased as
follows: The tenant "will use the premises for _." Id. at 207-08.
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ment appears strong, it has had little success.56 Consistent with the general
proposition that a tenant may use the leased premises for any lawful pur-
pose, absent a valid restriction, courts generally hold that a tenant is not
obligated to operate a particular business on the leased premises. 7 For ex-
ample, in Rapids Associates v. Shopko Stores,58 the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals held that a use clause does not require a tenant to continually operate
on the premises.5 9 Thus, "absent a clear and specific indication that the
landlord intended to limit the tenant's use of the property,"' a use clause is
permissive and not restrictive in nature.61 Accordingly, no implied cove-
nant of continuous operation will be found solely as a result of a use clause
being contained in the percentage lease.
Perhaps the most compelling case which denied implying a covenant of
continuous operation on the basis of a use clause is Weil v. Ann Lewis
Shops. 2 In Well, the lease contained a percentage rent provision and a use
clause. The premises were to be occupied and used for conducting a wo-
men's and children's retail store "'and not otherwise.' ,63 When the tenant
failed to take occupancy of the premises, the landlord sued and was denied
56. Id. at 207.
57. See Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 512, 647 P.2d at 643; Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing
Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1941); Masciotra, 105 Cal. App. 2d at 376, 233
P.2d at 586; Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp., 134 Ga. App. 834, 216 S.E.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1975); Stop
& Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248 (1964); Kretch v. Stark, 26 Ohio Op. 2d
385, 193 N.E.2d 307 (1962); Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, 376 Pa. Super. 580, 546 A.2d 676
(1988); Dickey, 377 Pa. at 549, 105 A.2d at 580; Rapids Ass'n v. Shopko Stores, 96 Wis. 2d 516,
292 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1980). But see sources cited infra note 68. See generally 49 AM. JUR.
2D Landlord and Tenant § 229, at 248 (1970); 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 326, at 850 (1968
& Supp. 1989).
58. 96 Wis. 2d 516, 292 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1980).
59. Id. at 519, 292 N.W.2d at 670. It is interesting to note that in Wisconsin a covenant of
continuous operation will probably never be implied. The Rapids decision pointed out that cove-
nants to restrict the use of demised premises must be expressly set forth in a lease and may not be
implied; this as a result of § 235.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes. See Wis. STAT. § 235.02 (1969),
renumbered Wis. STAT. § 706.10(6) (1987-88). Moreover, long term leases such as a percentage
lease are deemed a conveyance in Wisconsin and no covenant shall be implied in any conveyance.
Wis. STAT. § 706.10(6) (1987-88). Accordingly, a landlord must seek some remedy other than an
implied covenant of continuous operation to protect the financial interest in his or her property.
60. Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
61. Hatcho Corp. v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 22-23, 485 A.2d 1285, 1289 (1985); Silkey v.
Malone, 123 Ind. App. 395, 399, Ill N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ct. App. 1953) (en bane); Borgen v.
Wiglesworth, 189 Kan. 261, 265, 369 P.2d 360, 363 (1962); Otting v. Gradsky, 294 Ky. 779, 172
S.W.2d 554 (1943); Rapids, 96 Wis. 2d at 518, 292 N.W.2d at 670. But see Emro Marketing Co.
v. Plemmons, 855 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1988) (use clause is restrictive in nature).
62. 281 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Ct. App. 1955).
63. Id. at 653 (quoting the lease agreement).
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any recovery of percentage rental at the trial court level.' The issue on
appeal was whether the lease expressly, or by necessary implication, pro-
vided that the tenant would occupy and use the premises for the purposes
stated in the lease.65 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals found that use
clauses have never been held to be an agreement to continually occupy and
use the demised premises.6 6 Accordingly, no implied covenant of continu-
ous operation was found.67
However, there are courts which have held that a use clause is indicative
of a covenant of continuous operation.6 8 Nonetheless, many courts con-
strue even very strong "use provisions" as only restricting the use of the
property, and not as mandating that the property be used in fact.69 The
rationale for this ruling is that lease agreements are construed in favor of
the tenant and against the landlord.7 0 If it is clear from the lease as a
whole, the courts will imply a covenant of continuous operation.71 An im-
plied covenant of continuous operation, however, is rarely found and is
clearly the minority view. Thus, as a general statement of the law, a use
64. Id. The tenant paid the fixed minimum rental of $650 per month for 13 months. The
premises, however, lay dormant for 23 months. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and
awarded $16,295 in damages. However, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 654. In Dickey, the court stated:
Generally speaking, a provision in a lease that the premises are to be used only for a certain
prescribed purpose imports no obligation on the part of the [tenant] to use or continue to
use the premises for that purpose; such a provision is a covenant against a noncomplying
use, not a covenant to use.
337 Pa. at 552, 105 A.2d at 581; see also Percoff v. Solomon, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So. 2d 31 (1953);
Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 136, 280 P.2d at 775; William Berland Realty, 26 N.J. Super. at 477, 98
A.2d at 124; Palm v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950).
67. Weil, 281 S.W.2d at 656.
68. See, e.g., Emro Marketing Co., 855 F.2d 528; Simhawk Corp. v. Egler, 52 Ill. App. 2d
449, 202 N.E.2d 49 (App. Ct. 1964) (use clause provided that tenant should only use premises for
operation of shoe store); Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 8 Ill. 2d 571, 134 N.E.2d 806 (1956)
(use clause provided that tenant should use premises solely for staging harness races); Ingan-
namorte v. Kings Super Markets, 5 N.J. 223, 260 A.2d 841 (1970); Slater, 376 Pa. Super. 580, 546
A.2d 676; Ayres Jewelry Co. v. 0 & S Bldg., 419 P.2d 628 (Wyo. 1966) (premises to be used for
jewelry shop).
69. See, e.g., Congressional Amusement Corp. v. Weltman, 55 A.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1947)
(premises to be used for sale of alcoholic beverages and other associated items for "off sale" con-
sumption and no other purposes); Davis v. Wickline, 205 Va. 166, 135 S.E.2d 812 (1964) (prem-
ises to be used for drug store and no other purpose).
70. Forman, 767 F.2d at 880. "Because the [tenant] stands in the position of an owner in fee
with regard to rights of user ... covenants restricting the [tenant's] right of use are strictly con-
strued against the landlord where there is any ambiguity." 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 3.40, at 254 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
71. See, e.g., Stern v. Dunlap Co., 228 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1955).
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clause, standing alone, has little chance of imposing an implied covenant of
continuous operation.
C. Subleasing and Assigning in Percentage Leases
Like the use clause, a sublease or assignment clause may play an impor-
tant role in a court's determination of whether to imply a covenant of con-
tinuous operation in a percentage lease.72 Essentially, if there is an express
right to sublease the premises or assign the lease in a percentage lease,
courts will not imply a covenant of continuous operation.73 Courts base
this determination on the inconsistency between the lease permitting the
tenant to sublease or assign, and implying an obligation on the tenant to
remain on the premises and conduct business.74
Sometimes a landlord will argue that a different business operation on
the premises will severely curtail his or her ability to secure a percentage
rental. 75 This argument has met with some success. 76 Generally, however,
unless a sublease or an assignment clause requires the landlord's prior con-
sent, courts have little difficulty in allowing any legitimate business enter-
prise to operate on the premises as a subtenant.77 For example, in Carter v.
Safeway Stores,78 Carter brought an action against Safeway for, among
other things, a breach of an implied covenant of continuous operation. Pur-
suant to the assignment and sublease clause in the lease, Safeway assigned
the premises to a clothing store. Carter argued that since the rent percent-
age provision was based on gross sales, and a clothing store has a much
lower volume of business than that of a grocery store, the court should
imply a covenant of continuous operation. The court declined and held
72. 1 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 6.903, at 206.
73. Kroger, 134 Ga. at 834, 216 S.E.2d at 341; Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 102 Idaho 909,
643 P.2d 1079 (Ct. App. 1982); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Walgreen Co., 126 Ill. App. 3d 680, 467
N.E.2d 954 (1984); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Southland Corp., 111 Ill. App. 3d 67, 443
N.E.2d 294 (1982); Keystone, 459 N.E.2d at 420; Williams v. Safeway Stores, 198 Kan. 331, 424
P.2d 541 (1967); Vidrine v. Morein, 360 So. 2d 659 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v.
Hunt, 30 N.C. 84, 226 S.E.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1976); Rapids, 96 Wis. 2d at 516, 292 N.W.2d at 668.
74. See Kroger, 134 Ga. App. at 834, 216 S.E.2d at 341; Williams, 198 Kan. at 338, 424 P.2d
at 548 (and authorities cited therein).
75. Jones v. Andy Griffith Products, Inc., 35 N.C. App. 170, 241 S.E.2d 140 (1978).
76. See, e.g., John Hogan Enter., Inc. v. Kellogg, 187 Cal. App. 3d 589, 231 Cal. Rptr. 711
(Ct. App. 1986) (proposed assignee admitted they would never generate gross sales sufficient to
produce rental income equivalent to that being paid by tenant).
77. Williams, 198 Kan. at 331, 424 P.2d at 541; Tuttle v. W.T. Grant Co., 5 A.D.2d 370, 171
N.Y.S.2d 954 (App. Div. 1958), rev'd, 6 N.Y.2d 754, 159 N.E.2d 202, 186 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959)
(tenant can sublet to any legitimate business).
78. 154 Ariz. 546, 744 P.2d 458 (Ct. App. 1987).
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
that because nothing in the assignment or sublet clause required Carter's
consent, Safeway was free to assign its lease to any retail store.79
Landlords may prevent such harsh results, as exemplified in Carter, and
protect their interest in the percentage rental income by inserting specific
provisions in the percentage lease. For example, if the tenant's right to sub-
lease or assign is unrestrained, the landlord's interest will usually be pro-
tected when a provision providing that an average of previous rental
payments becomes the fixed minimum rental upon assignment or sub-
lease.80 Another way for landlords to protect their interest is to require the
tenant to obtain consent for any potential assignee or subtenant. Courts
have held that when consent is required, the landlord's refusal of a subten-
ant who is incapable of reaching the required percentage rental level is not
unreasonable."1 For example, in John Hogan Enterprises v. Kellogg,"2 the
California Court of Appeals held that it was not commercially unreasonable
for a lessor to withhold consent where a proposed assignee admitted that
they would never generate gross sales sufficient to produce rental income
equivalent to that being paid by the lessee.83 Thus, while a sublease or as-
signment clause may prevent an implied covenant of continuous operation,
landlords may still protect their interest in the percentage rent. Therefore,
any need to imply a covenant of continuous operation is clearly diminished
since the landlord's goal in seeking an implied covenant of continuous oper-
ation is generally to protect the landlord's interest in the property.
III. INTERPRETIVE METHODS
As stated throughout this Comment, a covenant of continuous opera-
tion generally will not be implied to protect the landlord's interest in the
property but will allow the landlord to receive that for which he originally
bargained. Originally, courts strictly construed the percentage lease,
whereas now they look more closely at the intentions of each party.
79. Id. at 548, 744 P.2d at 60; see also Williams, 198 Kan. at 331, 424 P.2d at 541.
80. See Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 4 A.D.2d 95, 163 N.Y.S.2d
332 (App. Div.), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 1017, 152 N.E.2d 542, 177 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1958). The lease in
Schmeck v. Bogatay, 259 Or. 188, 485 P.2d 1095 (1971), reserved a minimum rent of $450 per
month to be increased to $625 if tenant ceased personal operation. For comparable provisions, see
Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 136, 280 P.2d at 775; Food Fair Stores v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 200
A.2d 166 (Ct. Spec. App. 1964).
81. Jones, 35 N.C. App. at 170, 241 S.E.2d at 140.
82. 187 Cal. App. 3d 589, 231 Cal. Rptr. 711 (Ct. App. 1986).
83. Id. at 589, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
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A. The Substantial Minimum Rental Doctrine
A test which was frequently used by courts in determining whether to
apply a covenant of continuous operation is the substantial minimum rental
doctrine. This doctrine requires that the stipulated minimum rental must
not constitute substantial consideration. 4 Essentially this doctrine requires
a determination of whether the fixed minimum rental is either nominal or
substantial. The birth of the substantial minimum rental doctrine occurred
in Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 & 25s Stores. In Jenkins, the lease provided for
a guaranteed minimum rental of $2400 per year and five percent of the
tenant's annual gross sales. The tenant vacated the premises prior to the
expiration of the term but continued paying the minimum rental of $2,400
for the year. Thereafter, the landlords sought to recover an additional rent
under the percentage rental provision.8 6 The court held that since the lease
failed to show any stipulated agreement requiring the tenant to operate a
store on the demised premises, and the landlords protected their interest by
requiring a fixed minimum rental, the $2400 paid by the tenant was in full
settlement of the rent due.8 7
The Jenkins decision expressed a clear standard to determine whether to
imply a covenant of continuous operation. If the fixed minimum rental is
substantial, then an implied covenant of continuous operation will not be
found, and the tenant's payment of the fixed minimum rental to the land-
lord is sufficient.88 Conversely, if the fixed minimum rental is "nominal,"
an implied covenant of continuous operation will be found.8 9 Courts gener-
ally follow the substantial minimum rental doctrine in their interpretation
of a percentage lease (although it is clearly not the only factor) and will not
imply a covenant of continuous operation when the fixed minimum rental is
substantial.90 However, the Illinois Court of Appeals in Harvey v. Rolands
of Bloomington, Inc.,91 stated that a literal or strict construction of a per-
84. Accordingly, if the fixed minimum rental is substantial, no covenant will be implied; how-
ever, if the fixed minimum rental is not substantial, a covenant will be implied. Note, Resolving
Disputes, supra note 4, at 680.
85. 213 N.C. 606, 197 S.E. 174 (1938).
86. Id. at 608, 197 S.E. at 175.
87. Id.
88. Id. The court strongly emphasized the fact that the lease contained no clause requiring
the tenant to operate on the premises. This is the essence of strict interpretation; if a clause does
not mandate specific conduct, that conduct will not be enforced.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
91. 94 Ill. App. 2d 444, 237 N.E.2d 540 (1968).
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centage lease must give way to the purposes intended by the parties. 92 This
was a new development in the interpretation of the percentage lease, and it
continues today.
B. Intent Test
Courts today look more closely to the intent of each party when deter-
mining whether to imply a covenant of continuous operation.93 For exam-
ple, in Taylor v. Universal Tire, Inc.," the court held that the relation of
minimum fixed rental to total rent was not determinative in deciding
whether to apply a covenant of continuous operation. 95
The intent test involves looking at all relevant factors surrounding the
execution of a percentage lease.96 Considering that these factors may be
varied, it is easy to understand why the courts are inconsistent in their rea-
soning and results. Robert Schoshinski has illustrated the factors and the
resulting inconsistency:
The fact that extensive repairs or improvements have been made by
the lessor in anticipation of increased sales and therefore increased
rent under the percentage formula has been weighed in favor of im-
plying a covenant of continued use. Evidence of prior dealings be-
tween the parties may indicate that full and continued use of the
premises throughout the term was within the expectation of the par-
92. Id. at 449, 237 N.E.2d at 544. The court in Harvey reasoned that the real intention of the
parties is what controls, and not some particular word or phrase. Accordingly, the court noted
that searching out obscure possibilities in simple words should not be done if the party's purpose
then becomes distorted. Id. Although the Harvey court was determining rent due under a per-
centage lease, other courts also used an intent test to determine whether a covenant of continuous
operation should be implied. For cases illustrating a timeline of the court's interpretive methods,
see Kline, supra note 1, at 616-18.
93. One commentator provides:
Some recent decisions ... indicate that the courts are becoming more willing to closely
examine the circumstances surrounding execution of the lease in an effort to determine
whether the parties themselves considered the substantial minimum rent to be an adequate
return to the lessor. This trend is occurring concurrently with changes which are taking
place in the circumstances surrounding store leases. Most new store construction today is
taking place in the form of shopping centers, and, the percentage lease is the rule, rather
than the exception, in the modem shopping center lease. The exact percentage is negoti-
ated between lessor and lessee with as much importance as the minimum rental. The per-
centage rental has become something other than a "mere windfall," and, in fact, has
become almost as much the substance of the lease as the minimum rental. Therefore, this
trend in the courts today is a realistic appraisal by the courts of the context in which the
modem percentage lease is negotiated.
Kline, supra note 1, at 613 (footnotes omitted).
94. 672 S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
95. Id. at 779.
96. Marlton Operating Corp. v. Local Textile Mills, 137 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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ties at the commencement of the lease. And it has been suggested
that, even if a minimum rent is substantial, a tenant would not be
justified in discontinuing operations "for spite or to inflict harm."
Conversely, factors which have been noted or apparently consid-
ered in decisions which refused to imply a duty of continued use
include these situations: the lease was for the operation of a new
business and thus percentage rent was not heavily relied on; an ex-
press covenant of continuous operation was not included in a lease
which was quite lengthy, contained numerous provisions covering
many contingencies, and was entered into only after prolonged nego-
tiations; the lease authorized the tenant to remove his personal prop-
erty or fixtures from the premises during the term of the lease; other
leases by the same landlord contained an express covenant to use
leased premises; the lease contained an express provision against
competition by the lessor but not by the lessee.97
To avoid interpretation problems, the California Court of Appeals, in
Cousins Investment Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co.,98 established five rules for
implying covenants:
(1) The implication must rise from the language used or it must be
indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties;
(2) it must appear from the language used that it was so clearly
within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unneces-
sary to express it;
(3) implied covenants can only be justified on the grounds of legal
necessity;
(4) a promise can be implied only where it can be rightfully assumed
that it would have been made if attention would have been called to
it; [and]
(5) there can be no implied covenant where the subject is completely
covered by the contract.99
These rules have, for some reason, never been fully adopted by the
courts. 00 They appear to be useful guidelines that would lend assistance to
the courts in their determination of whether or not to imply a covenant of
continuous operation. However, assuming that an interpretation of the par-
ties' intent in a lease is difficult, as inconsistent rulings illustrate, perhaps
97. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, § 5.3, at 234-35 (footnotes omitted).
98. 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 (1941).
99. Id. at 149, 113 P.2d at 882.
100. These five rules are often used by courts, but not consistently. Much of the courts'
confusion lies in the failure to establish succinct rules for implying a covenant of continuous
operation. Given the fact that Cousins fully establishes a guideline, it is difficult to understand
why all jurisdictions have not adopted these guidelines.
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courts should use other methods to protect a landlord's financial interest in
property under a percentage lease.
IV. REMEDIES UPON TENANT'S VACATION OF THE PREMISES
Although there are cases to the contrary, if a tenant breaches a covenant
of continuous operation in a fixed rental lease, courts will permit the land-
lord to recover the stipulated rental.101 However, when a percentage lease
is involved, courts encounter a difficult problem when a tenant breaches a
covenant of continuous operation. When the breach occurs, courts must
provide the landlord with an adequate remedy. Generally, this remedy is in
the form of either specific performance or the recovery of damages. 102 Un-
fortunately, these remedies are usually inadequate relief for the landlord. 103
A. Specific Performance
Specific performance is primarily used as a remedy when an "anchor"
tenant in a shopping center prematurely vacates the premises.)° With re-
spect to the "anchor" tenant, there is great difficulty in estimating the loss
of percentage rent upon premature vacation.105 Also, a large vacant store
in a shopping center will presumably project an image for the shopping
center of financial instability." 6 This "image" could result in lost pa-
tronage, and thus, even greater financial losses to the landlord.107 Accord-
ingly, specific performance may be the only adequate remedy available to
guard against such potential losses.' By requiring the tenant to remain on
the premises and operate the business, the landlord then has the opportu-
101. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, §§ 10:10-:16.
102. Id. at 238-41; see also Note, Specific Performance of Shopping Center Leases in Califor-
nia, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 532 (1970) [hereinafter Note, Specific Performance]; Note, Damages: Im-
plied Covenants in Percentage Leases, 12 OKLA. L. REv. 293 (1959) [hereinafter Note, Damages].
103. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, § 5.5, at 238-41.
104. See Note, Specific Performance, supra note 102, at 535-37. The success of the shopping
center, and the business therein, depends on the landlord's ability to specifically enforce a tenant's
covenant to remain in business. This is especially true where an "anchor" tenant ceases opera-
tions on the demised property. When an "anchor" tenant prematurely vacates the premises, the
landlord and other shopping center tenants are deprived "of a business that was deliberately in-
cluded... to increase [the shopping center's] chances of success." Id. at 536.
105. Id.
106. Hemingway, Selected Problems in Leases of Community and Regional Shopping Centers,
16 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 29 (1964).
107. Id.
108. See Note, Specific Performance, supra note 102, at 537; see also Lincoln Tower Corp. v.
Richter's Jewelry Co., 152 Fla. 542, 12 So. 2d 452 (1943); Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Cushman's Sons, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 384, 164 A.2d 785 (1960).
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nity to receive his anticipated rental income. 1 9 However, courts are reluc-
tant to use specific performance as a remedy, and when it is issued, it often
does not provide adequate relief to the landlord.110 Moreover, specific per-
formance runs contrary to the doctrine of free alienability of property. The
tenant should be allowed to vacate the premises as long as appropriate dam-
ages are paid to the landlord. While the remedy of specific performance
may be essential to the survival of a large shopping mall, it seems unwar-
ranted for non-shopping mall tenants.
B. Assessing Damages
Assessing damages is often a major concern of the courts.111 As previ-
ously noted, when there is no fixed minimum rental, or the fixed minimum
rental is nominal, courts will usually imply a covenant of continuous opera-
tion. 12 However, when the fixed rental is substantial, the tenant is often
required to pay, as damages, only the fixed minimum amount.113 For ex-
ample, in Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp.,114 a percentage lease had been in effect
for about thirteen years at the time of the alleged breach.1 15 During the
first twelve years, annual sales were insufficient to invoke the percentage
rent clause. In the thirteenth year, however, increased sales resulted in an
additional payment of percentage rent above the fixed minimum rental. 116
When the tenant prematurely vacated the premises, the court determined
that since the tenant operated the premises for thirteen years, and only
reached the percentage rental level during one of those years, the percent-
age rental was a bonus and not really contemplated by the parties to be a
portion of the rent.117 Thus, only the fixed minimum rental was awarded as
damages.
109. Lonoke Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wayne & Neil Bennett Family Partnership, 12 Ark.
App. 282, 676 S.W.2d 461, aff'd en banc, 12 Ark. App. 286, 679 S.W.2d 823 (1984).
110. See, e.g., Dover, 63 N.J. Super. 384, 164 A.2d 785 (1960) (invoking specific performance
required due to inability to calculate damages). The most often cited reason for denying specific
performance is that excessive court supervision would be required. Lorch, Inc. v. Bessemer Mall
Shopping Center, Inc., 294 Ala. 17, 21, 310 So. 2d 872, 875 (1975); Madison Plaza, Inc. v. Shapira
Corp., 180 Ind. App. 141, 146, 387 N.E.2d 483, 486 (1979).
111. See Note, Damages, supra note 102. Damages are extremely difficult to calculate, since
future sales must be estimated to determine the percentage rent for which the tenant is liable.
112. See supra notes 44, 47-54 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
114. 134 Ga. App. 834, 216 S.E.2d 341 (1975).
115. The lease provides for minimum monthly payments of $2253 per month plus a percent-
age of sales in excess of $2,704,000 per year. Id. at 835, 216 S.E.2d at 345.
116. Id. at 836, 216 S.E.2d at 345.
117. Id. at 840, 216 S.E.2d at 344.
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The decision in Kroger appeared to be a simple matter. Because the ten-
ant's yearly sales were insufficient to meet the percentage rent level, the
court determined that the fixed minimum rent was substantial.1 18 There-
fore, only that amount was awarded as damages. However,. courts some-
times only award the fixed minimum rent as damages even when the tenant
is paying a greater amount based on the percentage rental provision. For
example, in Monte Corp. v. Stephens,1 19 the court held that the tenant would
only be required to pay the fixed minimum rental, even though the tenant
previously paid percentage rental above and beyond that amount. 120
These two cases illustrate the court's inability to establish clear guide-
lines when assessing damages. Indeed, problems of assessing damages in-
tensify when the tenant's operation is new or occupancy is very brief.1 21 In
these instances, there is no standard which courts may use to determine
damages. Thus, to make matters easier, courts often measure damages by
the fair rental value of the property. 122 It is this Commentator's opinion
that the fair rental value method could be used in every case, obviating the
need to imply a covenant of continuous operation.
C. Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc.: The Implied Convenant to Pay
Reasonable Rent
The Idaho Court of Appeals, in Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 23 made a
significant impact on the interpretation of percentage leases when it implied
a covenant to pay reasonable rent. 124 Although the facts in Bastian are
easily distinguishable, the decision does provide a unique and useful way to
interpret the percentage rent provision.
1. Facts
In Bastian, the landlord leased property to the tenant for use as a gro-
cery store in 1948. After the leased building was destroyed by fire in 1961,
the parties entered into extensive renegotiation of the existing lease, which
118. Id. Although, the Georgia Court of Appeals also considered that the lease was assigna-
ble in its decision, the greatest emphasis in the decision was placed on the substantiality of the
fixed minimum rental. Id.
119. 324 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1958).
120. Id. at 539. The rent percentage provision provided for $200 per month or seven percent
of gross sales. For two years the tenant paid over $400 per month before prematurely vacating the
premises. Id.
121. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Davis, 47 Ga. App. 601, 171 S.E. 150 (1933) (damages measured
by the fair rental value of premises when no other adequate basis exists).
122. Id.
123. 102 Idaho 909, 643 P.2d 1079 (Ct. App. 1982).
124. Id.
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did not expire until 1968. As a compromise, the parties "hammered out" a
new lease agreement. 25 This agreement gave the landlord a flat $1000
monthly rental until 1968. The lease also provided the tenant with a right to
renew the lease for an additional ten-year period after 1968, for $1000 per
month or a percentage of gross sales, whichever was greater.
The lease was renewed for the ten-year period in 1968. However, in
1976, the tenant ceased operating the grocery store and opened a new store
nearby. 126 The tenant had an express right, under the lease agreement, to
assign the lease or sublet the property. The tenant never did. Instead, the
tenant maintained possession of the property throughout the remaining pe-
riod of the lease, paying the landlord the minimum rental of $1000 per
month. Before the expiration of the lease, the landlord sued to enjoin the
tenant from ceasing its business operations on the demised premises, claim-
ing that the lease contained an implied covenant of continuous operation.
A bifurcated trial was held to determine liability and damages on the
claimed breach of the lease. The trial court held that although there was no
implied covenant of continuous operation, the lease agreement did contain
an implied covenant to pay reasonable and adequate rent for the property
should the tenant discontinue business, but not to assign or sublet the
property. 127
2. The Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed two significant issues:
(1) whether the trial court erred in failing to find an implied covenant of
continuous operation, 28 and (2) whether the trial court erred in determin-
ing that there was an implied covenant to pay reasonable and adequate
rent. 129 With respect to the implied covenant of continuous operation, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that a covenant could not
be found.13° The court had little difficulty in making this decision and sim-
ply followed the general rule that when the tenant is granted an unre-
125. Id. at 910, 643 P.2d at 1080. In addition to agreeing on the rental, both parties agreed to
contribute to the cost of a new building. The landlord contributed $90,000 while the tenant con-
tributed between $50,000 and $60,000. Id.
126. Id. Immediately prior to vacating the premises, the tenant removed fixtures and shelv-
ing from the premises pursuant to an express right. Id.
127. Id. at 911, 643 P.2d at 1081.
128. Id.
129. Id. There was also another issue concerning attorneys' fees, however it is not significant
for the purposes of this discussion. Id. at 915, 643 P.2d at 1085.
130. Id. at 912, 643 P.2d at 1084.
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strained right to assign or sublease the premises, it is inconsistent to imply a
covenant of continuous operation. 131
The court of appeals fully accepted the trial court's decision to imply a
covenant to pay reasonable rent. The trial court found that the parties
failed to explicitly state in the lease what the rental would be if the tenant
stopped using the premises. Although there was a provision relating to the
payment of rent by the tenant upon assignment or sublease, this provision
was silent on rental if the tenant elected not to assign the lease or sublet the
property. Thus, as a result of deeming the flat $1000 monthly rental inade-
quate, the trial court implied a covenant to pay reasonable rent. 132
Then, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted the factual similarities of Lipp-
man v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 133 as a basis for its affirmation and stated:
Since the parties had made specific provisions in the Lippman
lease that the rental (or damages) would be the average of the pre-
ceding twelve months rental in the event lessee assigned or subleased
or abandoned the premises, the California Supreme Court agreed
this was a proper measure of damages to apply where Sears had
abandoned "the integral purpose for which the lease was made."' 134
Unlike Lippman, however, the landlord in Bastian failed to set forth any
guidelines for determining an adequate rental upon assignment or sublease.
The court of appeals had no standard by which to assess damages. Accord-
ingly, the court implied a covenant to pay reasonable and adequate rent to
fill "the void left by the parties as to what was to occur if the [tenant] quit
its sales operation; yet did not assign or sublet."' 135
Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that
the landlord was entitled to damages in the amount of the fair rental value
of the property. The court of appeals noted that:
In arriving at the fair rental value, the trial court considered several
factors - the value of the property from the perspective of a hypo-
thetical new lessee, the past rental history of the property, the cir-
cumstances of the parties in the leasing of the property, and a fair
return on the lessors' investment in the property. 136
131. For cases following the general rule that it is inconsistent to imply a covenant of contin-
uous operation when an express right to sublease or assign exists, see cases cited supra note 73.
132. Bastian, 102 Idaho at 911, 643 P.2d at 1084.
133. 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955).
134. Bastian, 102 Idaho at 913, 643 P.2d at 1083.
135. Id. at 914, 643 P.2d at 1084.
136. Id. at 915, 643 P.2d at 1085.
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Thus, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that there was substantial and
competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of a reasonable rent,
and did not disturb the decision on appeal.
3. Critique
In Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc.,13 7 the Idaho Court of Appeals broke new
ground in interpreting percentage leases. Never before - and unfortunately
not since - has a court implied a covenant to pay reasonable rent after
failing to imply a covenant of continuous operation. 138 This decision is sig-
nificant because it gave the tenant an opportunity to vacate the premises,
while it enabled the landlord to receive the fair rental value of the demised
property. Accordingly, both parties' problems and concerns were suffi-
ciently addressed. This resolution was successful due to the implied cove-
nant to pay reasonable rent.
As a result of conflicting provisions in the percentage lease, the Idaho
Court of Appeals was confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, the
court deemed the fixed minimum rental inadequate compensation for the
value of the property. This, in essence, mandated finding an implied cove-
nant of continuous operation.139 On the other hand, however, there existed
a right on the part of the tenant to assign the lease or sublet the property.
This, in essence, mandated not implying a covenant of continuous opera-
tion.1" Either way, the court would have contradicted well-established ma-
jority law.
For example, if the court had implied a covenant of continuous opera-
tion, the result would have been inconsistent with the majority view that an
implied covenant of continuous operation will not be found when there is a
right of the tenant to assign or sublease.141 Also, if the court did not find an
implied covenant of continuous operation, the landlord would only be pro-
vided with nominal rent. This too would be inconsistent with the majority
view. 42 Thus, the court addressed both of these problems by denying an
implied covenant of continuous operation, yet finding an implied covenant
to pay reasonable rent.
137. 102 Idaho 909, 643 P.2d 1079 (Ct. App. 1982).
138. But see Joffe v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 31 Ohio App. 3d 243, 510 N.E.2d 834 (1986)
(court refused to imply covenant of continuous operation but implied covenant requiring tenant to
pay additional rent for subleased premises).
139. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
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Obviously, this conflict does not occur only when dealing with a fixed
rental lease. Absent an express provision to the contrary, the tenant could
vacate the premises and simply pay the fixed rental."g3 When dealing with a
percentage lease, however, courts are concerned with providing reasonable
and adequate rental to the landlord. This is why landlords argue for an
implied covenant of continuous operation.
In Bastian, however, the court did not need to imply a covenant of con-
tinuous operation to give the landlord an opportunity to receive the reason-
able value of the property. This was accomplished by implying a covenant
to pay reasonable rent. This leads to the question of whether implying a
covenant of continuous operation is really necessary to provide relief to the
landlord. Unfortunately, the Bastian court did not address this question.
The court did, however, establish an effective method to circumvent the
problems in implying a covenant of continuous operation, when it implied a
covenant to pay reasonable rent. Perhaps now courts may begin to imply a
covenant to pay reasonable rent, rather than imply a covenant of continu-
ous operation.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion illustrates that courts have difficulty in deter-
mining whether to imply covenants of continuous operation in percentage
leases. However, in light of Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc.,1" and other practi-
cal approaches, it appears possible to eliminate the interpretation problem
altogether. As previously stated throughout this Comment, the main pur-
pose in implying a covenant of continuous operation in a percentage lease is
to protect the landlord's financial interest in the value of his property when
a tenant prematurely vacates the premises. Although an implied covenant
of continuous operation may still be necessary if a landlord seeks termina-
tion of a lease or seeks specific performance of an "anchor" tenant in a
shopping mall, it appears wholly unnecessary if the landlord is simply at-
tempting to protect his financial interest in a property.
Careful lease drafting usually eliminates the need to imply covenants of
continuous operation. Inserting an express covenant of continuous opera-
tion or a liquidated damages clause will eliminate most problems. More-
over, the lease can also include a provision whereby the tenant pays the fair
market value of the property for the duration of the lease if the tenant pre-
maturely vacates the premises. Alternatively, the landlord could seek a judi-
cial determination of the fair market value as was illustrated in Bastian.
143. See generally R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 227.
144. 102 Idaho 909, 643 P.2d 1079 (Ct. App. 1982).
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Pursuant to Bastian, courts may now begin to imply covenants to pay rea-
sonable rent, rather than implying a covenant of continuous operation. Es-
sentially, the ultimate effect is the same. Overall, the implied covenant of
continuous operation still has its use, but if the landlord is merely seeking to
protect a financial interest in property, other approaches are more
appropriate.
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